




Examining the tradeoff between confidence and optimism in future forecasts
Stavrova, O.; Evans, A.M.
Published in:






Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Stavrova, O., & Evans, A. M. (2019). Examining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in future
forecasts. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 32(1), 3-14. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2087
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. Jan. 2022
Received: 1 December 2017 Revised: 19 April 2018 Accepted: 19 April 2018
DOI: 10.1002/bdm.2087R E S E A R CH AR T I C L EExamining the trade‐off between confidence and optimism in
future forecasts
Olga Stavrova | Anthony M. EvansDepartment of Social Psychology, Tilburg
University, Tilburg, the Netherlands
Correspondence
Olga Stavrova, Department of Social
Psychology, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg, the Netherlands.
Email: o.stavrova@uvt.nl- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This is an open access article under the terms of th
the original work is properly cited.
© 2018 The Authors Journal of Behavioral Decisio
J Behav Dec Making. 2019;32:3–14.Abstract
Confident business forecasters are seen as more credible and competent (“confidence
heuristic”). We explored a boundary condition of this effect by examining how individ-
uals react to the trade‐off between confidence and optimism. Using hypothetical sce-
narios, we examined this trade‐off from the perspectives of judges (i.e., business
owners who hired analysts to make sales predictions) and forecasters (i.e., the analysts
hired to make predictions). Participants were assigned to the role of either judges or
forecasters and were asked to rate 2 potential forecasts. In the “no trade‐off” condi-
tion, the 2 forecasts were aligned in optimism and confidence (the more confident
forecast was also more optimistic); in the “trade‐off” condition, the more confident
forecast was less optimistic. In Experiment 1, judges were more likely to positively
evaluate confident forecasters when confident forecasters were the more (vs. less)
optimistic ones. Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters were aware of judges'
preferences for optimism and strategically relied on methods that resulted in more
optimistic (but less reliable) predictions. Experiment 3 directly compared the perspec-
tives of judges and forecasters, revealing that forecasters overestimated judges' pref-
erences for optimism over confidence. The present studies show that forecasters and
judges have different views of the trade‐off between confidence and optimism and
that forecasters may unnecessarily sacrifice accuracy for optimism.
KEYWORDS
advice giving, confidence heuristic, forecasts, optimism, warmth, morality, and competence1 | INTRODUCTION
When making important decisions, people often rely on advisors for
help with forecasting, that is, estimating the probabilities of different
future outcomes (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Hadar & Fischer, 2008).
For example, estimates of rain probability by weather forecasters
determine farming activities; earnings forecasts of securities analysts
affect investors' decisions; and sales forecasts of business consultants
inform the development strategies of managers. In short, forecasts
(and how people respond to them) play an important role in economic- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
e Creative Commons Attribution Li
n Making Published by John Wileand organizational decision making (Silver, 2012; Tetlock, Mellers,
Rohrbaugh, & Chen, 2014).
What factors shape perceptions of forecasts and forecasters?
Advice‐taking research has shown that advisor confidence is a primary
factor in perceptions of advisor credibility (Price & Stone, 2004;
Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Confidence
may serve as a cue to the advisor's expertise: People might trust con-
fident advisors more because they assume that confidence is a direct
consequence of expertise—the phenomenon labeled “confidence heu-
ristic” (Price & Stone, 2004).- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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4 STAVROVA AND EVANSBut what happens when forecasters face a trade‐off between con-
fidence and optimism? How do clients react when a confident advisor
makes a prediction that is at odds with their hopes? For example, what
happens when an advisor predicts poor future earnings or a stock price
decline? Decades of research on motivated reasoning suggest that peo-
ple are more likely to trust information that is consistent (vs. inconsis-
tent) with their desires and goals (Kunda, 1990). Yet advice‐taking
research has not considered how forecast valence affects perceived
credibility and the general evaluation of the advice giver. Does making
a pessimistic forecast cause a confident advisor to appear less reliable?
And do advisors strategically select forecasting methods that ensure
optimistic forecasts for their clients, even at the cost of confidence?
The present studies were designed to answer these questions.
Following previous research on likelihood judgment (Price & Stone,
2004) and advice taking (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), we focused on fore-
casts that are made by one person (forecaster) to facilitate the deci-
sion making by another (judge). First, we examined how judges
evaluate forecasters: When there is a trade‐off between confidence
and optimism, do judges always prefer a more confident forecaster?
Second, we asked if forecasters sacrifice confidence for optimism. In
other words, we asked if forecasters would rely on methods that result
in more optimistic, but less accurate, predictions. Finally, we compared
the perspectives of judges and forecasters: Do forecasters overesti-
mate or underestimate judges' desire to forgo confidence for opti-
mism? The present research has implications for understanding how
forecasters calibrate their predictions to the desires of clients, and
whether forecasters (unnecessarily) sacrifice accuracy for optimism.2 | CONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM IN THE
EVALUATION OF FORECASTERS
Confidence can represent a cue to knowledge, competence, or status.
Confident individuals are often more likely to attain higher status and
become influential within their groups (Anderson, Brion, Moore, &
Kennedy, 2012; Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997). Confidence also affects
credibility in the legal domain (Brewer & Burke, 2002) and in the
context of financial advice taking (Price & Stone, 2004; Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005). For example, advisors
who predicted that a particular stock price will increase in value with
a stronger degree of confidence (e.g., those who were 95% confi-
dent) were seen as more knowledgeable and even more accurate
in their prediction than advisors who predicted the same outcome
with a lower degree of confidence (e.g., those who were only 75%
confident; Price & Stone, 2004). In the absence of any other infor-
mation, people tend to equate confidence with accuracy. Interest-
ingly, confidence backfires when it is associated with low accuracy
(Sah, Moore, & MacCoun, 2013; also see Tenney, MacCoun,
Spellman, & Hastie, 2007).
We propose that forecast valence is another factor that might
override judges' reliance on advisor confidence. Psychological research
on unrealistic optimism suggests that outcome desirability biases judg-
ments of future events (Shepperd, Klein, Waters, & Weinstein, 2013;
Weinstein, 1980). For example, people tend to overestimate the like-
lihood that they will experience positive (vs. negative) life events(Weinstein, 1980). Similarly, research on motivated reasoning has
shown that individuals tend to process new information in biased
ways, by overweighting preference‐consistent and discounting prefer-
ence‐inconsistent information (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Kunda, 1990).
Motivated reasoning guides political attitudes, beliefs about climate
change, and trust in science (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Kahan
et al., 2012; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2017). For example, par-
ticipants who were randomly assigned to receive a negative (vs. posi-
tive) medical diagnosis were more likely to question the validity of the
diagnosis and took more time to accept it (Ditto, Munro, Apanovitch,
Scepansky, & Lockhart, 2003).
Distrust of undesirable information also undermines evaluations
of the information source. Studies on the “kill‐the‐messenger” effect
suggest that people do not like those who give them bad news
(Gawronski & Walther, 2008; Manis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974; Walther,
Nagengast, & Trasselli, 2005). In line with the associative transfer of
valence models (Walther, 2002), it has been proposed that the com-
municator is “contaminated” by the valence of the information he/
she transmits, which has downstream consequences for his or her
evaluation. For example, individuals randomly assigned to summarize
a political speech were judged more favorably by listeners who agreed
with the speech's content (Manis et al., 1974).3 | PERCEPTIONS OF WARMTH,
MORALITY, AND COMPETENCE
Advice‐taking research has focused on evaluations of advisor compe-
tence and credibility. Yet decades of research on social perception
have shown that other dimensions of person perception—warmth
and morality—might be more important than competence (Abele,
Cuddy, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2008; Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Brambilla,
Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto,
2007). Warmth refers to perceptions of friendliness and likeability,
and morality refers to perceptions of honesty and trustworthiness.
Recent research has proposed that not only perceptions of compe-
tence but also perceptions of warmth and morality are associated with
the attribution of status (Bai, 2017; Hartley et al., 2016). For example,
people are more easily influenced by group members who care about
the group (Willer, 2009) and are more likely to vote for warm political
candidates (Adams & Mullen, 2013). Appearing warm (but not compe-
tent) can compensate for a foreign origin and contribute to an
increased likelihood of getting invited for a job interview (Agerström,
Björklund, Carlsson, & Rooth, 2012).
In the area of future business forecasts, valence might affect per-
ceptions of warmth and morality. A generally optimistic worldview and
smiling behavior are associated with perceptions of warmth and
morality (Evans & van de Calseyde, 2017; Vollmann, Renner, & Weber,
2007; Wang, Mao, Li, & Liu, 2017). Thus, optimistic forecasters may
be seen as more friendly, likeable, and well‐intentioned. As warmth
and morality have been shown to dominate impression formation
(Abele & Bruckmüller, 2011; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2013), opti-
mism might be important for the general evaluation of the advisor.
Taken together, these findings imply that both optimism and confi-
dence influence evaluations of forecasters.
STAVROVA AND EVANS 54 | CONFIDENCE AND OPTIMISM IN
FORECASTERS ' CHOICES
It is also important tounderstand forecasters' beliefs about how their pre-
dictions will affect the downstream evaluations of clients. The literature
on feedback giving suggests that forecasters might be well‐aware of
judges' preferences for optimism and that forecasters might strategically
use this knowledge. When people have to give negative feedback, they
often stonewall or modify the feedback to make it sound more positive
(DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Harber, Stafford, & Kennedy, 2010). This effect
is particularly strong in face‐to‐face (vs. indirect) communication (Waung
& Highhouse, 1997) and among individuals with a strong need to belong
and be liked by others (Jeffries & Hornsey, 2012). In organizations, reluc-
tance to give negative feedback can result in an organization‐wide with-
holding of problems and issues, undermine performance, and damage
clients' well‐being (Henriksen & Dayton, 2006; Morrison & Milliken,
2000). We propose that forecasters strategically select methods that
result in more optimistic predictions for their clients, even when these
methods are known to produce less reliable estimates.
We also explore forecasters' beliefs about how judges will react to
their predictions and ask whether forecasters accurately anticipate
judges' preferences. Even though forecasters might be aware of judges'
preferences for positive predictions, they might still underestimate
judges' willingness to “punish” a pessimistic forecaster. In fact, recent
research on lay theories of decision making suggests that people hold a
general assumption of rationality (optimality) when explaining other
people's choices (Johnson & Rips, 2015). The assumption of rationality
implies that judges should evaluate forecasters based on the quality and
certainty of their forecasts. As a result, forecasters might underestimate
the degree to which judges are biased by their desire for good news.
At the same time, people also believe that common decision‐mak-
ing biases (for example, a self‐serving or a desirability bias) affect other
people's judgment more than their own judgment (Pronin, Gilovich, &
Ross, 2004). For example, although people might believe that others'
evaluation of a validity of a test is biased by the positivity of these
test's results, they consider their own judgment to be immune to moti-
vated reasoning. In addition, studies have shown that people tend to
make cynical attributions of others' behavior (Critcher & Dunning,
2011; Miller, 1999). As a result, forecasters might overestimate the
extent to which judges' evaluations are based on perceptions of
likeability, rather than competence. Taken together, these findings
suggest that forecasters might overestimate the degree to which
judges' evaluations are affected by forecast positivity.1The results do not depend on whether these participants are removed from the
analyses or not (see Supporting Information).5 | OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIES
Three experiments examined judges' and forecasters' reactions to the
trade‐off between confidence and optimism. Experiment 1 explored
how introducing a trade‐off between confidence and optimism influenced
judges' perception of forecasters. We asked if judges would prefer a more
confident (but less optimistic) forecaster or a less confident (butmore opti-
mistic) forecaster. Experiment 2 focused on forecasters, examining
whether they prefer forecasting methods that produce optimistic or cer-
tain predictions. To conclude, Experiment 3 compared the perspectivesof judges and forecasters to determinewhether forecasters underestimate
or overestimate judges' willingness to sacrifice confidence for optimism.
Study materials and data for all three studies can be downloaded
from the project's Open Science Framework page (https://osf.io/
8ecg6/?view_only=844cbf02823d45e89d38bd0f2df16762).5.1 | Experiment 1: Judges' judgment
Previous research has emphasized that judges evaluate confident fore-
casters more favorably. Our first study investigated whether introduc-
ing the trade‐off between confidence and optimism influences this
preference. We predicted that in the absence of a trade‐off, judges
would evaluate more confident advisors positively. However, intro-
ducing a trade‐off between forecast confidence and optimism
(whereby confident forecasts were less optimistic) would reduce or
even eliminate judges' preference for confident forecasters.
5.1.1 | Method
Participants
To be able to detect a small‐to‐medium effectwith a two‐tailed test and a
statistical power of .80, we aimed to recruit 75 participants per cell. One
hundred fifty‐one adult Americans completed the study on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Seven did not respond correctly to an atten-
tion check question (s. below) andwere removed, resulting in a final sam-
ple of 144 individuals (Mage = 36.46, SDage = 12.51, 49.3% male).
1
Procedure
This study had a between‐subjects design with two conditions. Partic-
ipants were asked to imagine that they owned a small clothing busi-
ness and hired two independent business analysts to make next
year's sales forecast. Both analysts made forecasts and provided infor-
mation on how certain they are in their forecasts.
In the “no trade‐off condition,” forecaster A projected a 1% sales
increase and was 76% certain in the forecast, whereas forecaster B
projected a 5% sales increase and was 80% certain. That is, the fore-
caster who made a more optimistic forecast was also more confident
than the forecaster who made a less optimistic forecast.
In the “trade‐off condition,” forecaster A projected a 5% sales
increase and was 76% certain in the forecast, whereas forecaster B
projected a 1% sales increase and was 80% certain. That is, a more
optimistic forecast was less confident than a less optimistic forecast.
After having read the scenario, participants indicated which ana-
lyst they would rely on to make business development and personnel
decisions (1 = A, 9 = B) and indicated whether they believed analyst A
(= 1) or B (= 9) to be warmer (friendly, warm, and likeable; Cronbach's
α = .90), more moral (honest, well‐intentioned, and sincere; Cronbach's
α = .79), and more competent (competent, skilled, and intelligent,
Cronbach's α = .91), and who they would hire again (1 = A, 9 = B).
As an attention check question, participants were asked which analyst
(A or B) projected a 5% increase, indicated how familiar they are with
sales forecasts (1 = not at all, 9 = very much), and responded to basic
sociodemographic questions.
TABLE 1 Means, standard deviations, and zero‐order correlations among the variables, Study 1
Rating dimensions
No trade‐off condition (n = 74) Trade‐off condition (n = 70)
M SD M SD 1 2 3 4
1 Choice 6.61 2.14 5.31 2.20 – – – –
2 Willingness to hire 6.46 2.11 5.40 2.58 .88*** – – –
3 Warmth 5.64 1.32 4.78 1.35 .34*** .32*** – –
4 Morality 5.31 1.47 5.29 1.37 .49*** .58*** .53*** –
5 Competence 5.82 1.36 5.28 1.78 .67*** .75*** .42*** .69***
Note. All rating dimensions are coded such that higher scores correspond to a stronger preference for the more confident forecaster.
***p < .001,**p < .01,*p < .05.
2The results do not depend on whether these participants are removed from the
analyses or not (see Supporting Information).
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Means, standard deviations, and zero‐order correlations among the
variables are shown in Table 1. The mean ratings by condition are
shown in Figure 1.
First, we examined the effect of forecast valence by comparing
mean ratings between the two conditions. Note that higher scores
indicate stronger preferences for the more (vs. less) confident forecast
and forecaster.
Choice and willingness to hire
Introducing the trade‐off between confidence and optimism reduced
judges' relative preferences for confidence (no trade‐off condition:
M = 6.61, SD = 2.14; trade‐off condition: M = 5.31, SD = 2.20),
t(142) = 3.58, p < .001, d = .60. The trade‐off also made judges less
willing to hire a more confident advisor (no trade‐off condition:
M = 6.46, SD = 2.11; trade‐off condition: M = 5.40, SD = 2.58),
t(142) = 2.71, p = .008, d = .45. In fact, comparing participants' ratings
to the point of indifference (scale midpoint = 5) revealed that intro-
ducing the confidence and optimism trade‐off eliminated judges' pref-
erence for confidence (choice: t(69) = 1.20, p = .24, d = .14; willingness
to hire: t(69) = 1.30, p = .20, d = .16).
Perceptions of warmth, morality, and competence
When there was a trade‐off between optimism and confidence, more
(vs. less) confident advisors were seen as less warm (trade‐off:
M = 5.64, SD = 1.32; no trade‐off: M = 4.78, SD = 1.35;
t(142) = 3.83, p < .001, d = .64) and less competent (trade‐off:
M = 5.82, SD = 1.36; M = 5.28, SD = 1.78; t(142) = 2.07, p = .041,
d = .34), but not less moral (p = .92, d = .01). Comparing participants'
ratings with the scale midpoint (5) showed that, in the trade‐off condi-
tion, a more positive but less confident forecaster and a less positive
but more confident forecaster were rated as equally warm and compe-
tent (warmth: t(69) = 1.35, p = .18, d = .16; competence: t(69) = 1.30,
p = .20, d = .16).
5.1.3 | Discussion
Judges preferred confident forecasters, but only insofar as the confi-
dent forecasters' predictions were consistent with the judges' desires
for a positive outcome. That is, only when confident forecasters
painted an optimistic picture of the future. Introducing a trade‐off
between confidence and optimism led judges to trust a more positive
(but less confident) and a more confident (but less positive) forecasters
to the same extent, eliminating judges' preferences for confidence.5.2 | Experiment 2: Forecasters' judgment
In Experiment 2, we took the perspective of forecasters and examined
whether they were aware of judges' preference for optimism and
whether forecasters were willing to sacrifice confidence to make more
optimistic forecasts for their clients.
5.2.1 | Participants
Following Study 1, the sample size was set at 75 participants per con-
dition. One hundred forty‐eighty MTurk workers completed the study.
Workers who participated in Experiment 1 were not eligible for Exper-
iment 2. Fifteen participants did not respond correctly to an attention
check question (the same question we used in Study 1) and were
removed, resulting in a final sample of 133 individuals (Mage = 34.48,
SDage = 9.87, 48.9% male).
2
5.2.2 | Procedure
The study used the same procedure as Study 1, except that partici-
pants were now asked to imagine the scenario from the perspective
of the forecaster: They were instructed to imagine that they worked
as independent business consultants and were hired by a small cloth-
ing company to make the company's sales forecast for the next year.
They also learned that their forecast would be used to make business
development and personnel decisions. They further read that they had
used two different forecasting methods that produced different
results.
In the “no trade‐off condition,” participants learned that Method
A projected a 1% sales increase with a 76% certainty, whereas
Method B projected a 5% sales increase with an 80% certainty. In
the “trade‐off condition,”Method A projected a 5% sales increase with
a 76% certainty, whereas Method B projected a 1% sales increase
with an 80% certainty.
Participants then indicated which method they would rely on to
make the forecast (1 = A, 9 = B). We also asked participants which
method (1 = A, 9 = B) would make clients judge them as warmer
(friendly, warm, and likeable; Cronbach's α = .90), more moral (honest,
well‐intentioned, and sincere; Cronbach's α = .79), and more compe-
tent (competent, skilled, and intelligent, Cronbach's α = .91). Finally,
we asked which method would increase their chances of getting hired
by the client again (1 = A, 9 = B). In contrast to the judges (Experiment
1), forecasters additionally indicated the forecast based on which
FIGURE 1 Mean ratings (1 = stronger preference for a less certain option, 9 = stronger preference for a more certain option), Studies 1 and 2. The
horizontal line indicates the scale midpoint (that is, point of indifference between the two options). Error bars are standard errors [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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tion). At the end, they responded to an attention check question (the
same as in Study 1), indicated how familiar they are with sales fore-
casts (1 = not at all, 9 = very much), and answered basic
sociodemographic questions.5.2.3 | Results
Means, standard deviations, and zero‐order correlations among the
variables are shown in Table 2. The mean ratings by condition are
shown in Figure 1.
Choice and inferred willingness to hire
Introducing the trade‐off between confidence and optimism made
forecasters less likely to select the more certain forecasting method
(no trade‐off: M = 7.66, SD = 1.89; trade‐off condition: M = 4.60,
SD = 2.66), t(110) = 7.56, p < .001, d = 1.44). Comparing participants'
responses with the scale midpoint showed that in the trade‐off condi-
tion, participants did not have a preference for a more confident
option any longer, t(62) = 1.18, p = .24, d = .15. Moreover, forecasters
believed that they would be less likely to be hired for making a confi-
dent forecast when doing so involved a trade‐off between confidence
and optimism (no trade‐off: M = 7.67, SD = 1.72; trade‐off: M = 3.84,
SD = 2.26), t(115) = 10.92, p < .001, d = 2.01. When the forecastTABLE 2 Means, standard deviations, and zero‐order correlations among
No trade‐off condition (n = 70)
Rating dimensions M SD
1 Choice 7.66 1.89
2 Inferred willingness to hire 7.67 1.72
3 Inferred perception of warmth 6.70 1.66
4 Inferred perception of morality 6.30 2.05
5 Inferred perception of competence 7.07 1.82
6 Accuracy perception 7.17 2.08
Note. All rating dimensions are coded such that higher scores correspond to a
***p < .001,**p < .01,*p < .05.produced by a more confident method was less optimistic, forecasters
believed that relying on a more confident method would reduce their
clients' willingness to hire them again, t(62) = 4.07, p < .001, d = 1.03.
Inferred perceptions of warmth, morality, and competence
Forecasters believed that making confident forecasts would have
stronger positive effects on judges' perceptions of warmth, compe-
tence, and morality in the absence (warmth:M = 6.70, SD = 1.67; com-
petence: M = 7.07, SD = 1.82, morality: M = 6.30, SD = 2.05) versus
presence (warmth: M = 4.24, SD = 1.72; competence: M = 4.87,
SD = 2.21; morality: M = 5.25, SD = 2.05) of a trade‐off between con-
fidence and optimism (warmth: t(131) = 8.38, p < .001, d = 1.46; com-
petence: t(131) = 2.95, p = .004, d = 1.09; morality: t(120) = 6.23,
p < .001, d = .51). When a more confident method was presented as
giving a less optimistic estimate than a less confident method, partici-
pants believed that selecting a more confident method would not
bring them any benefits in terms of competence and morality ratings
(competence: t(62) = .48, p = .64, d = .06; morality: t(62) = .98,
p = .33, d = .12) and would lead them to be perceived as less warm,
t(62) = 3.51, p = .001, d = .91.
Accuracy perception
Including the trade‐off between optimism and confidence decreased
forecasters' belief that a more confident forecast was more accuratethe variables, Study 2
Trade‐off condition (n = 63)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
4.60 2.66 – – – – –
3.84 2.26 .70*** – – – –
4.24 1.72 .65*** .71*** – – –
5.25 2.05 .67*** .49*** .69*** – –
4.87 2.21 .85*** .64*** .70*** .71*** –
6.40 2.30 .56*** .27** .38*** .61*** .57***
stronger preference for the more certain method.
FIGURE 2 Effects of condition on rating
dimensions in judges (Study 1) and forecasters
(Study 2). The estimates represent Cohen's d
effect sizes, error bars—standard errors
8 STAVROVA AND EVANSthan a less confident forecast (no trade‐off: M = 7.17, SD = 2.08;
trade‐off condition: M = 6.40, SD = 2.30), t(131) = 2.04, p = .044,
d = .35. This result most probably represents an instance of a desirabil-
ity bias; in other words, people tend to believe that positive or desir-
able events more likely to occur than negative or undesirable events
(Krizan & Windschitl, 2009).
5.2.4 | Discussion
Forecasters were sensitive to judges' preferences for optimism and
strategically used them in their forecasts. Forecasters' preferences
for certain methods vanished once a more certain method produced
a less optimistic prediction for their clients. In fact, forecasters
believed that using a more certain method would make their clients
perceive them as less warm and less likely to hire them again, if cer-
tainty was associated with a less optimistic prediction.3In this study, the manipulation of optimism involved an 80% versus 60%
chance of meeting the sales target and the manipulation of confidence involved
an 80% versus 60% certainty. As an attention check question, participants indi-
cated which forecast had an 80% certainty. We assumed that participants con-
fused an 80% certainty with an 80% chance (which referred to the same option
in the no trade‐off condition and different options in the trade‐off condition). As
the decision to recruit an additional set of data was made after we analyzed the
first subsample, it is important to note that all the effects that we consider “sig-
nificant” are associated with p values below the “peeking‐adjusted” value of
.025 (and most p values are below .002).5.3 | Joint analyses of Experiments 1 and 2
The results of our first two studies hint at the possibility that fore-
casters might overestimate the impact of optimism on clients' judg-
ments. In Study 1, comparing the ratings in the trade‐off condition
with the scale midpoint revealed that clients did not differentiate
between a more optimistic but less confident forecaster and a less
optimistic but more confident forecaster: They were perceived as
being equally warm, moral, and competent; and they were equally
likely to be relied on and get hired again. However, in Study 2, fore-
casters tended to think that producing a less positive but more confi-
dent (vs. more positive but less confident) forecast would make their
clients see them as less warm and less likely to hire them again.
To test whether the effect of the experimental condition was
indeed stronger in the sample of forecasters than in the sample of
judges, we used the Fisher r‐to‐z transformation and compared the
effect of the condition on all dependent variables from Experiments
1 (judges) and 2 (forecasters). Across all dependent measures, the
effect of condition (trade‐off vs. no trade‐off) was significantly stron-
ger in forecasters than in clients (z between −5.29 [p < .001] and −2.03
[p = .042]). These results are shown on Figure 2. That is, forecasters
were not only sensitive to clients' preferences for optimism in busi-
ness forecasts, they tended to overestimate them. In fact, forecasters
believed that forgoing certainty to be able to provide a more optimis-
tic forecast would make their clients see them as more friendly and
likeable, and also more likely to hire them again.5.4 | Experiment 3: A joint examination of judges
and forecasters
We conducted a third experiment to replicate and extend our results.
Experiment 3 was designed to address two limitations of our previous
experiments: First, in Experiments 1 and 2, different numbers were
used to manipulate optimism (1% vs. 5% increase in sales) and confi-
dence (76% vs. 80% levels of certainty). Even though the absolute dif-
ference between 1% and 5% is the same as the difference between
76% and 80%, the two comparisons may have been perceived differ-
ently by participants (e.g., the difference between 1 and 5% may have
seemed more extreme than the difference between 76% and 80%).
Therefore, in Experiment 3, we used a scenario in which optimism
and confidence were manipulated using the same metric. Second,
Experiment 3 sought to replicate the findings using a different fore-
casting scenario and included both the forecasters and judges condi-
tions, allowing for a direct comparison.5.4.1 | Method
Participants
To be able to detect a medium‐sized two‐way interaction effect with
80% power and a two‐tailed test, we initially decided to recruit 50 par-
ticipants per cell (at least 200 overall). Thus, our first sample consisted
of 232 adult Americans completed the study on MTurk. Thirty‐three
participants did not correctly answer an attention check question
and 28 (85%) of those were in the trade‐off condition. We noticed
that the attention check question could have been easily
misinterpreted by the participants in the trade‐off condition.3 There-
fore, we decided to keep these participants in the analyses (notice that
removing them does not result in substantially different results, see
Supporting Information).
To be certain in our conclusions, we collected an additional 230
observations (this time, we removed the ambiguous attention check
STAVROVA AND EVANS 9question). Therefore, the final sample consisted of 462 participants
(Mage = 35.20, SDage = 11.31, 60.6% male). The results of the analyses
conducted with only the first and only the second set of participants
are presented in the Supporting Information.
Procedure
This study had a 2 (trade‐off vs. no trade‐off) × 2 (forecaster vs. judge)
between‐subjects design. In the “forecaster conditions,” participants
were asked to imagine that they owned a small clothing business
and hired two independent business analysts to make predictions
about whether or not they will meet their sales goals for the next year.
In the “judge conditions,” participants imagined that they worked as
independent business analysts and were hired by a clothing company
to make a prediction about whether or not the company will meet its
sales goals for the next year. They were also informed that they used
two different forecasting methods that produced different results.
In the “no trade‐off conditions,” analyst A (or method A, in the
forecaster condition) predicted that there is an 80% chance the com-
pany will meet its goals and was 80% certain about this prediction.
Analyst B (or method B, in the forecaster condition) predicted that
there was a 60% chance the company will meet its goals and was
60% certain about this prediction.
In the “trade‐off conditions,” analyst (vs. method) A predicted that
there is an 80% chance the company will meet its goals and was 60%
certain about this prediction. Analyst (vs. method) B predicted that
there was a 60% chance the company will meet its goals and was
80% certain about this prediction. In other words, in the no trade‐off
condition, a more confident forecast was a more optimistic one,
whereas in the trade‐off condition, a more confident forecast was a
less optimistic one.
After having read the scenario, participants indicated which ana-
lyst (vs. method) they would rely on (1 = A, 9 = B). Participants
assigned to play a role of judges indicated which analyst (A = 1 or
B = 9) they believed to be warmer (friendly, warm, and likeable;
Cronbach's α = .88), more moral (honest, well‐intentioned, and sincere;
Cronbach's α = .86), and more competent (competent, skilled, and
intelligent, Cronbach's α = .95), and who they would hire again
(1 = A, 9 = B). Participants assigned to play a role of forecasters indi-
cated what method choice (1 = A, 9 = B) will make their client judge
them as warmer (friendly, warm, and likeable; Cronbach's α = .93),
more moral (honest, well‐intentioned, and sincere; Cronbach'sTABLE 3 Means, standard deviations, and zero‐order correlations among
Judges Forec
No trade‐off
condition (n = 116)
Trade‐off
condition (n = 114)
No tra
condit
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD
1 Choice 6.47 (2.24) 6.49 (2.14) 7.79 (
2 Willingness to hire 6.28 (2.38) 6.54 (2.12) 7.87 (
3 Warmth 5.66 (1.35) 5.00 (1.41) 6.86 (
4 Morality 5.40 (1.43) 5.69 (1.52) 7.14 (
5 Competence 5.94 (1.62) 5.93 (1.52) 7.51 (
Note. All rating dimensions are coded such that higher scores correspond to a
***p < .001.α = .85), and more competent (competent, skilled, and intelligent,
Cronbach's α = .95) and will increase their chances of getting hired
by this client again (1 = A, 9 = B).5.4.2 | Results
Zero‐order correlations among the variables are shown in Table 3 and
mean responses by condition are plotted in Figure 3.
We estimated a 2 (trade‐off vs. no trade‐off) × 2 (forecaster vs.
judge) MANOVA with choice, willingness to hire, warmth, morality,
and competence ratings as dependent variables. The omnibus test
revealed significant main effects of the two manipulated factors
(trade‐off/no trade‐off factor: Pillai's Trace F (5,454) = 24.45,
p < .001, η2partial = .21; forecaster/judge factor: Pillai's Trace
F (5,454) = 16.16, p < .001, η2partial = .15) and a significant interaction
(Pillai's Trace F (5,454) = 9.87, p < .001, η2partial = .10).
Choice
The effect of the trade‐off/no trade‐off factor was significant,
F (1,458) = 5.76, p = .017, η2partial = .012. This effect was qualified
by a significant interaction with the forecaster/judge factor,
F (1,458) = 6.40, p = .012, η2partial = .014. Forecasters were less likely
to select the more certain option when it was less (vs. more) optimistic
(no trade‐off: M = 7.79, SD = 1.81; trade‐off condition: M = 6.82,
SD = 2.30, F (1,458) = 12.20, p = .001, η2partial = .03). As indicated
by a comparison with the scale midpoint, forecasters still preferred a
more certain to a less certain option, t(114) = 8.49, p < .001. On the
opposite and in contrast to the results of Study 1, judges preferred
the more confident forecaster, regardless of whether he was more
or less optimistic (no trade‐off: M = 6.47, SD = 2.24; trade‐off condi-
tion: M = 6.49, SD = 2.14, F (1,458) = .01, p = .927, η2partial = .00).
Willingness to hire
The main effect of the trade‐off/no trade‐off condition and its interac-
tion with the forecaster/judge factor reached significance,
F (1,458) = 21.74, p < .001, η2partial = .05 and F (1,458) = 35.67,
p < .001, η2partial = .07, respectively. Consistent with the findings of
Study 2, forecasters believed that if they make a more confident fore-
cast that is also more (vs. less) optimistic, judges would be more likely
to hire them again (no trade‐off: M = 7.87, SD = 1.83; trade‐off condi-
tion: M = 5.70, SD = 2.49, F (1,458) = 56.79, p < .001, η2partial = .11).the variables, Study 3
asters
de‐off
ion (n = 117)
Trade‐off
condition (n = 115)
) M (SD) 1 2 3 4
1.81) 6.82 (2.30) – – – –
1.73) 5.70 (2.49) .75*** – – –
1.61) 4.96 (1.87) .31*** .43*** – –
1.56) 6.46 (1.95) .55*** .51*** .61*** –
1.49) 6.31 (2.12) .65*** .64*** .57*** .80***
stronger preference for the more certain option.
FIGURE 3 Mean ratings (1 = stronger preference for a less certain option, 9 = stronger preference for a more certain option), Study 3. The horizontal
line indicates the scale midpoint (that is, point of indifference between the two choices). Error bars are standard errors [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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the analyst who made a more confident forecast regardless of how
positive this forecast was (no trade‐off: M = 6.28, SD = 2.38; trade‐off
condition:M = 6.54, SD = 2.12, F (1,458) = .85, p = .356, η2partial = .002).
That is, although forecasters were sensitive to the trade‐off between
confidence and optimism in both sets of studies, judges' reactions dif-
fered across the studies.
Warmth
The main effect of the trade‐off/no trade‐off factor reached signifi-
cance, F (1,458) = 76.13, p < .001, η2partial = .14. Both judges and fore-
casters associated a more confident forecast with higher ratings of
warmth in the absence (M = 6.26, SD = 1.60) versus presence
(M = 4.98, SD = 1.66) of a trade‐off between confidence and optimism,
replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2. Comparing participants'
ratings with the scale midpoint showed that, in the presence of a
trade‐off, both judges' and forecasters' preference for confidence
disappeared (t(113) = 0.00, p = 1.00 and t(114) = 0.23, p = .82,
respectively). The main effect of the trade‐off factor was further
qualified by a significant interaction with the forecaster/judge factor,
F (1,458) = 18.13, p < .001, η2partial = .04. Forecasters' believed judges'
ratings to be more affected by the presence of a trade‐off (Mdif = 1.90,
F (1,458) = 84.65, p < .001, η2partial = .16) than they actually were
(Mdif = 0.66, F (1,458) = 9.94, p = .002, η
2
partial = .02).Morality
There was a significant main effect of the forecaster/judge factor,
F (1,458) = 86.54, p < .001, η2partial = .13, such that forecasters
believed that judges would ascribe them higher morality ratings
(M = 6.80, SD = 1.79) than they actually did (M = 5.69, SD = 1.52).
As indicated by a significant interaction, F (1,458) = 10.39, p = .001,
η2partial = .02, forecasters believed that judges would rate them more
moral in the no trade‐off than in the trade‐off condition (Mdif = 0.68,
F (1,458) = 10.10, p = .002, η2partial = .02), whereas judges' evaluation
of forecasters' morality was not affected by the presence of the
trade‐off (Mdif = −0.29, F (1,458) = 1.87, p = .172, η
2
partial = .004).
Comparing the responses with the scale midpoint revealed that both
forecasters and judges associated a more certain option with a higher
level of morality, even when it was less optimistic (t(114) = 8.04,
p < .001 and t(113) = 4.86, p < .001, respectively).
Competence
The effect of the trade‐off/no trade‐off factor was significant,
F (1,458) = 14.41, p < .001, η2partial = .03. It was further qualified by
a significant interaction with the forecaster/judge factor,
F (1,458) = 14.22, p < .001, η2partial = .03. Forecasters thought that
judges would ascribe them a higher level of competence in the no
trade‐off (M = 7.51, SD = 1.49) than in the trade‐off condition
(M = 6.31, SD = 2.12, F (1,458) = 28.75, p < .001, η2partial = .06),
STAVROVA AND EVANS 11whereas judges were indifferent to the presence/absence of the
trade‐off (Mdif = 0.004, F (1,458) = 0.00, p = .99, η
2
partial = .00). Both
forecasters and judges associated a more certain option with higher
competence, even when it was less optimistic (t(114) = 6.60,
p < .001 and t(113) = 6.53, p < .001, respectively).5.4.3 | Discussion
Corroborating our previous studies, Experiment 3 revealed an asym-
metry in how judges and forecasters value optimism versus confi-
dence. Forecasters tended to assume that making a more confident
but less optimistic forecast will make them appear less favorably to
their clients (that is, judges) and will make their clients less likely to
hire them again. In turn, forecasters' preferences for prediction
methods were guided by the likelihood of producing a more optimistic
forecast. Yet judges' preferences for more confident forecasters were
barely affected by how optimistic they were. Whereas judges per-
ceived more confident forecasters to be warmer when they produced
more (vs. less) optimistic predictions, they were still more likely to
trust and hire a more confident forecaster even when he was less
(vs. more) optimistic.6 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
Despite the practical importance of forecasts, psychological research
on the perception of and evaluation of forecasts and forecasters has
remained relatively scarce (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Forecaster confi-
dence is one factor that consistently affects forecast credibility. More
confident forecasters are perceived as more competent and trustwor-
thy than less confident forecasters—a phenomenon referred to as the
confidence heuristic (Price & Stone, 2004). Bringing together these
findings with the literature on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990),
we explored how forecasters and their clients (or “judges”) react to a
trade‐off between confidence and optimism.
When there was a trade‐off between confidence and optimism
(and the more confident forecaster predicted an undesirable outcome),
judges' positive perceptions of the confident forecaster were dimin-
ished. This pattern was strongest for attributions of warmth. In both
Experiments 1 and 3, judges considered more (vs. less) optimistic fore-
casters warmer, even when they were less confident. These results are
in line with previous work documenting the positive effect of disposi-
tional optimism on inferences of warmth (e.g., Evans & van de
Calseyde, 2017). Optimism may be related to the perception of
warmth for multiple reasons: Optimists may be seen as having a strong
desire to avoid hurting other people's feelings, which represents a cen-
tral aspect of interpersonal warmth. Additionally, judges might think
that optimists have stronger beliefs in the business owner's ability
and competence, which could also inform perceptions of warmth.
The results of Experiment 1 (but not 3) further showed that judges'
propensity to trust and establish long‐term business relationships with
confident forecasters vanished when the more confident forecaster
made a less optimistic forecast.
Experiment 2 demonstrated that forecasters anticipate judges'
preference for optimism and use optimistic forecasting methods that
are likely to please their clients. Forecasters strategically selectedmethods likely to result in optimistic, rather than pessimistic, predic-
tions. This pattern of behavior is an example of withholding negative
information, a widely documented behavior in organizations
(Henriksen & Dayton, 2006). For example, managers soften negative
feedback for the sake of avoiding conflicts and to maintain positive
relationships with their subordinates (Fisher, 1979; Larson, 1986). This
willingness to sacrifice certainty for optimism can be explained by
practical considerations: Forecasters believed that bringing positive
news to their clients, even if the news was uncertain, would lead their
clients to see them as more friendly and likeable and would increase
their chances of getting hired again.
Importantly, comparing the results of Experiment 1 (judges) and
Experiment 2 (forecasters) suggests that forecasters overestimate
the degree to which judges are affected by forecast valence. This pat-
tern of results was further obtained in Experiment 3, which included a
direct comparison of forecasters' and judges' preferences. Forecasters
believed that their clients (“judges”) were more willing to sacrifice con-
fidence for optimism than the clients (“judges”) actually were. In other
words, forecasters overestimated the degree to which their clients
were subjects to motivated reasoning. This finding is consistent with
previous research showing that individuals generally tend to
overestimate other people's susceptibility to judgment biases (Pronin
et al., 2004).
Such knowledge asymmetries are common in advisor–judge dyads
(Rader, Larrick, & Soll, 2017). For example, judges' limited access to
the reasons behind advisors' recommendation is seen as a source of
their tendency to discount others' advice in decision making (Yaniv &
Kleinberger, 2000). Advisors' limited access to their clients' risk
preferences results in their advice being guided by their own, rather
than their clients', risk preferences (Hadar & Fischer, 2008). The
present studies contribute to this literature by showing that advisors'
lack of insight into their clients' preferences (specifically, the overesti-
mation of their clients' preferences for optimism) can undermine
advice quality.
We propose that forecasters' willingness to forgo certainty for
optimism results from their desire to please clients. Could it represent
an instance of motivated reasoning instead? Forecasters could have
genuinely believed that, at an equal level of certainty, more optimistic
methods are also more likely to be more accurate. Indeed, forecasters
in Experiment 2 believed that optimistic predictions were more likely
to come true. That is, both judges and forecasters themselves could
have been subjects to motivated reasoning. This is not unlikely: Even
though forecasters were formally independent from their clients, their
future earnings depended on whether their clients would have the
funds to hire them again, rendering a bias‐free judgment challenging.
Yet this account predicts that the tendency to use motivated rea-
soning should have been stronger among judges than forecasters
(after all, judges were the direct beneficiaries of positive forecasts).
However, we found the opposite: The effects of optimism were stron-
ger for forecasters than judges. Even though forecasters might have
been subjects to motivated reasoning, their willingness to forgo cer-
tainty to make a positive prediction for their clients is more likely to
be the result of their desire to please their clients. More studies are
needed to pinpoint the precise processes underlying forecasters' pref-
erence for optimism. For example, if forecasters are driven by a desire
12 STAVROVA AND EVANSto please the clients and ensure future commissions, then increasing
forecasters' motivation to make accurate predictions should reduce
their preferences for optimism.
Whereas forecasters' preferences for optimistic predictions
emerged consistently across studies, judges' preferences for more
optimistic forecasters depend on the specifics of the forecasting sce-
nario. Judges traded‐off certainty for optimism when optimism
reflected a 4% stronger increase in sales (Experiment 1), but not when
optimism reflected a 20% higher chance of meeting sales target
(Experiment 3). We speculate that the difference in predicted sales
growth could have felt more natural, objective, and easy to grasp than
the difference in a predicted chance of meeting one's sales target. It is
also possible that failing to meet one's self‐set sales target did not feel
particularly threatening to the judges—after all, they had the power to
adjust their target. Finally, being subject to motivated reasoning,
judges could have shown an optimistic bias in interpreting the pre-
dicted chance of meeting their sales target: For example, they could
have interpreted a forecast predicting a 60% (vs. 80%) chance of
meeting their sales target as implying a 60% (vs. 80%) chance of miss-
ing their target by a small amount (e.g., having a 4.9% instead of a 5%
sales growth).
In contrast, for forecasters, predicting a lower chance that their
clients' will meet their sales target implies giving their clients a nega-
tive feedback regarding their ability and competence—feedback they
may be unwilling to give (Harber et al., 2010; Waung & Highhouse,
1997). We propose that developing a manipulation of optimism that
would feel the same for both judges and forecasters (while at the same
time being comparable in strength with the manipulation of confi-
dence) is an important prerequisite for establishing the relative impor-
tance of optimism. For example, it might be informative to capitalize
on participants' comparative thinking and frame both optimism and
confidence relative to a certain reference point, such as participants'
expectations. Manipulating the role (forecasters vs. judges) within‐
subjects by asking participants to respond to the same scenarios as
both forecasters and judges might represent another way of address-
ing these issues. At a more general level, the above discrepancies point
at the importance of testing our findings' generalizability across differ-
ent scenarios.
The hypothetical nature of the scenarios we used is a potential
limitation of the present research. Hypothetical scenarios are
usually less personally relevant for the participants. As motivated
reasoning has been shown to increase with personal relevance
and importance (e.g., Leeper, 2014), our studies could have
underestimated participants' willingness to sacrifice confidence for
optimism. We hope that future research will shed light on whether
forecasters' and judges' preferences for optimism are indeed stron-
ger in more personally relevant scenarios. In addition, although we
have shown that expressing less optimism can negatively affect the
evaluation of a confident forecaster, it might be interesting to
explore whether expressing less confidence can soften the negative
impact of a pessimistic forecaster. On a related note, it might be
worthwhile to investigate how much confidence individuals are
willing to sacrifice for optimism and how much more confident a
pessimistic forecast should be (compared with an optimistic one)
to be accepted.Additionally, although our participants were willing to forgo confi-
dence for optimism, it is less clear whether this tendency will persist in
a long‐term context. Will judges reconsider their evaluation of opti-
mistic forecasters when having access to the information about fore-
cast accuracy? Sah et al. (2013) showed that giving judges access to
the information about advice accuracy can undermine their reliance
on the confidence heuristic in assessing the credibility of their advi-
sors. In a similar vein, it is worthwhile to explore whether judges will
update their evaluation of optimistic versus pessimistic forecasters in
response to accuracy information. Individuals are more likely to
update their beliefs in response to positive than to negative informa-
tion—a phenomenon labeled asymmetric updating (Sharot & Garrett,
2016; Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011; Shepperd et al., 2013). Hence, it
might be interesting to explore individuals' propensity to adjust their
beliefs based on recently obtained forecasts that differ in both opti-
mism and certainty. Finally, existing research has shown that the
degree to which people utilize others' advice largely depends on the
adviser's expertise (Meshi, Biele, Korn, & Heekeren, 2012). Therefore,
although our studies were based on a scenario depicting expert advice,
it might be informative to explore whether individuals' would also
trade‐off confidence for optimism when the adviser is a novice.
The present findings have practical implications. When providing
an accurate prediction means delivering bad news, forecasters face a
conflict of interest between their desire to please the client (as a
way of maintain a long‐term relationship) and their professional obli-
gation to give accurate advice. Such conflicts of interests arise when
the consumer of the advice is the same party that hires the advisor
and pays his/her fees (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Moore, Tetlock,
Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006). For example, accounting firms hired and
paid by the firms they audit have incentives to deliver positive
auditing results, a practice often mentioned as playing a central role
in many recent corporate scandals (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016). Simi-
larly, security analysts were shown to be optimistically biased in their
earnings forecasts, such that even during a 2000 stock market crash,
99% of brokerage analysts continued issuing “strong buy,” “buy,” or
“hold” recommendations to their clients (Moore et al., 2006). Advisors'
desire to please the clients can result in organization‐wide suppression
of problems, a phenomenon referred to as organizational silence
(Henriksen & Dayton, 2006). Costs can be high. Observation studies
in the health context demonstrated that individuals' tendency to with-
hold negative information might result in direct harm to the patients
(Maxfield, Grenny, McMillan, Patterson, & Switzler, 2005).7 | CONCLUSION
Given the importance of advice in economic and organizational deci-
sion making, finding ways to improve advice quality represents an
important endeavor for future research. Our findings suggest that
advisors' desires to please their clients might undermine the quality
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